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THE MISTAKES OF MEDICAID:
PROVIDER PAYMENT DURING THE PAST
DECADE AND LESSONS FOR HEALTH
CARE REFORM IN THE 21ST CENTURY
This case is about money and not about quality of care.'
Indeed, the [medicaid payment] requirement necessarily establishes
a tension between Congress's concern for keeping Medicaid costs
as low as possible on the one hand and its regard far providing
quality care to Medicaid recipients on the other. 2
Health care costs are spiralling, as a result of inflation, high-tech
advances, the aging population and defensive medical practices. 3 State
and federal tax revenues for the payment of health care are declining
due to an economic recession.' Hospitals, nursing homes, doctors and
other health care providers who participate in the medicaid program
are caught in the cross fire between increasing costs and decreasing
payments.5
In 1990, total national health care expenditures reached $666.2
billion' Medicaid was the single largest contributor to the rising cost
of public health care coverage, growing by 20.7% from 1989 through
1990.1
 The problem of paying medical providers adequate amounts
without bankrupting the payer is a critical issue for both the govern-
ment-funded health care programs and the health care system as a
whole. 8
After Congress amended the federal medicaid laws and granted
states increased authority in 1980 to determine the level of payment
1
 Folden v, Washington Dep't of Soc. & Health Servs., 744 F. Supp. 1507, 1518 (W.D. Wash.
1990), aff'd, 981 F.2d 1054 (9th Cir. 1992).
2
 Fulkerson v. Maine Dep't of Human Servs., 802 F. Supp. 529, 534 (D. Me. 1992).
3
 See Katharine R. Levit et al., National Health Expenditures, 1990, HEALTH CARE FINANCING
REV., Fall 1991, at 30; Helen C. Lazenby & Suzanne W. Letsch, National Health Expenditures, 1989,
HEALTH CARE FINANCING REV., Winter 1990, at 4, fig.2; Office of National Cost Estimates,
National Health Expenditures, 1988, HEALTH CARE FINANCING REV., Slimmer 1990, at 1, 2.
4
 See Levit, supra note 3, at 29, 30; Sally T. Sonnefelcl et al., Projections of National Health
Expenditures Through the Year 2000, HEALTII CARE FINANCING REV., Fall 1991, at I.
5 See West Virginia Univ. Hosps. v. Casey, 885 F.2d 11, 14 (3d Cir, 1989), cert. granted, 494
U.S. 1003 (1990).
6
 Levit, supra note 3, at 29.
7 Id.
8
 See Sonnefeld, supra note 4, at 1.
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to medicaid providers, states were faced with two options for control-
ling medicaid costs: cutting services or cutting expenditures.9 After
many states cut optional medicaid services, they began developing
creative payment systems that began to slow the increases in medicaid
expenditures.° In response to level, and often declining, reimburse-
ment, many providers and even some medicaid recipients have chal-
lenged the adequacy of medicaid payment in federal court." Many
such plaintiffs have succeeded in convincing federal judges that pay-
ment is inadequate, and in invalidating state payment systems.' ]
The result has been increased federal judicial involvement in state
medicaid plans, and confusion for the states regarding how to develop
a payment system methodology that a state can afford and a court will
uphold." The balance of adequacy and reasonableness is the challenge
of the health care system." Increased litigation and judicial involve-
ment in complex health care payment issues are not the answer.°
Before we undertake reform of our health care system, we must review
the problems of the current system and decide what we have learned
from our mistakes.°
This Note addresses some of these fundamental issues in the
context of the medicaid provider payment system. Section I describes
the medicaid program and the statutory framework governing pay-
ment to medicaid providers.° Section II discusses the conflicting case
law regarding the § 1983 cause of action in medicaid provider payment
litigation." Section III discusses the standard of judicial review in
9 See HEAITH CARE FACILITIES LAW: CRITICAL ISSUES FOR HOSPITALS, HMOS AND EXTENDED
CARE FACILITIES 417 (Anne M. Dellinger ed., 1991).
See generally Roberti. Buchanan et al., Medicaid Payment Policies for Nursing Home Care:
A National Survey, HEALTH CARE FINANCING Rey., Fall 1991, at 56.
II See, e.g., Folden v. Washington Dept of Social & Health Servs., 981 F.2d 1054,1055-56 (9th
Cir, 1992) (nursing homes); Fulkerson v. Maine Dept of Human Servs., 802 F. Supp. 529, 532
(D. Me. 1992) (recipients); West Virginia Univ. Hasps. v. Casey, 885 F.2d 11, 14 (3d Cir. 1989)
(hospitals).
12 See, e.g., Temple Univ. v. White, 941 F.2d 201, 220 (3d Cir. 1991), cert. denied, Snider v.
Temple Univ., 112 S. Ct. 873 (1992); Pinnacle Nursing Home v. Axelrod, 928 F.2d 1306, 1318 (2d
Cir. 1991); Casey, 885 F,2d at 35; AMISUB v. Colorado Dep't. of Social Servs., 879 F.2d 789, 801
(10th Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 496 U.S. 935 (1990); Illinois Health Care Ass'n v. Bradley, 776 F.
Supp. 411, 423 (N.D. Ill. 1991), aff'd, 983 F.2d 1460 (7th Cir. 1993); Multicare Medical Ctr. v.
Washington, 768 F. Supp. 1349, 1402 (W.D. Wash. 1991); Michigan Hosp. Ass'n v. Babcock, 736
F. Supp. 759, 764 (W.D. Mich. 1990),
" See infra notes 52-173 and accompanying text.
14 See Sonnefeld, supra note 4, at 1.
15 See infra notes 174-239 and accompanying text.
lb See infra notes 52-173 and accompanying text.
17 See infra notes 22-51 and accompanying text.
18 See infra notes 52-105 and accompanying text.
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medicaid provider payment litigation.° Section IV analyzes the prob-
lems of judicial enforcement of federal medicaid statutes and judicial
review of state medicaid agency actions." Section IV also identifies
possible solutions to the problems of provider payment, and how these
solutions are relevant to the larger reform of the American health care
system.2 '
I. STATUTORY FRAMEWORK FOR MEDICAID PROVIDER PAYMENT
Congress enacted medicaid in 1965 to provide medical care to the
poor and disabled." Unlike medicare, which is a federal program,
medicaid is a joint state-federal program, administered at the state
level; to receive federal matching funds, participating states must pro-
vide a minimum level of services to at least those individuals who are
categorically needy." Participating states must provide medicaid to
those who receive assistance under the Aid to Families with Dependent
Children and the Supplemental Security Income programs." Medicaid
agencies must submit a detailed state plan that meets the requirements
of the federal statute and regulations."
Prior to 1981, states were required to pay all medicaid providers
on the basis of uniform medicare "reasonable charges," which were
determined by the Secretary of Health and Human Services ("HHS") . 26
Recognizing the inherently inflationary nature of these payments, Con-
gress amended the federal medicaid statute in 1980 and 1981 to allow
states flexibility and creativity in payment of providers, within general
federal guidelines. 27
 The state plan that each state medicaid agency
must file with HEIS must include appeal procedures for provider griev-
ances.28
 States need not, however, include an opportunity to challenge
19
 See infra notes 106-173 and accompanying text.
"See infra notes 174-239 and accompanying text.
21 See infra notes 240-252 and accompanying text.
22 See 42 U.S.C. § 1396a (1988).
23 42 U.S,C, § 1396a(a)(17). Slates that participate in Medicaid—all states except Arizona—
!mist comply with federal Medicaid requirements. Smith v. Miller, 665 F.2d 172, 175 (7th Cir.
1981).
21
 42 U.S.C. §§ 1396a(a)(17) (services), 601 to 615 (AFDC), 1381 to 1383c (SSI) (1988).
28 42 U.S.C. § 1396a; 42 C.F.R. § 447.201 (1992).
26 See 42 U.S.C. § 1396a(a) (13) (E)	 (1979)	 ("reasonable cost related basis");
§ 1396a(a) (30)(A) (1979) ("reasonable charges").
27 See Pub. L. No. 95-499 § 962(a), 94 Stat. 2650 (1980) (Boren Amendment); Pub. L. No.
97-35 § 2173, 95 Stat. 808 (1981) (expanding Boren Amendment to apply to hospitals); Pub. L.
No. 97-35 § 2174(a), 95 Stat 809 (1981) (removing "reasonable charges" language from section
30(A)).
28 42 C.F.R. § 447.253(c) (1990).
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the overall medicaid payment policy, and may instead limit appeals to
whether the policy has been fairly applied to a specific provider. 29
Medicaid payments to acute care hospitals, nursing homes and
facilities for the mentally retarded are governed by 42 U.S.C.
§ 1396a(a) (13) (A), called the "Boren Amendment" because its chief
proponent was Senator David L. Boren of Oklahoma." This section
requires states to pay rates which are reasonable and adequate to meet
the costs of efficient and economical providers. 31 More specifically, the
statute requires that the state provide:
[F]or payment . . . of the hospital services, nursing facility
services, and services in an intermediate care facility for the
mentally retarded provided under the plan through the use
of rates . . . which the State finds and makes assurances satis-
factory to the Secretary [of Health and Human Services], are
reasonable and adequate to meet the costs of efficiently and
economically operated facilities in order to provide care and
services in conformity with applicable State and Federal laws,
regulations, and quality and safety standards and to assure
that individuals eligible for medical assistance have reason-
able access . . . to inpatient hospital services of adequate
quality . . . . 32
Regulations issued by HHS require states to prove to the Health
Care Financing Administration ("HCFA") that the "Medicaid agency
pays for inpatient hospital services and long-term care facility services
through the use of rates that are reasonable and adequate to meet the
costs that must be incurred by efficiently and economically operated
providers."' These regulations do not define the terms "reasonable
and adequate," "costs" or "economically and efficiently." 34 These pro-
visions apply to the reimbursement of long-term care facilities, and
only the inpatient portion of costs of hospitals." Outpatient costs, a
'29 Wilder v. Virginia Hosp. Ass'n, 496 U.S. 498, 522-23 (1990).
30 See id. at 502; 42 U.S.C. § I396a(a) (13) (A). The term "acute care hospitals" refers to
general inpatient hospitals, as opposed to chronic care hospitals that treat long-term conditions.
See Stedman's Medical Dictionary, 22, 305, 726 (William R. Hensyl ed., 25th ed. 1990).
31 42 U,S.C, 1396a(a)(13) (A).
32 1d,
33 42 C.F.R. § 447.253(h) (1) (i) (1992).
34 See 42 C.F.R. § 447.250 to 447.280.
35 42 C.F.R. § 447.251 (defining "provider" to mean "an institution that furnishes inpatient
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significant portion of hospital costs, are not governed by the Boren
Amendment."
Payment for all care and services available under the state medi-
caid plan, including hospital outpatient costs, and all other types of
medicaid providers not covered under the Boren Amendment, are
generally governed by 42 U.S.C. § 1396a(a) (30) (A) ("Section
30(A)")." Section 30(A) requires that such payment be consistent with
economy, efficiency and quality of care." A state's medicaid plan must:
[P]provide such methods and procedures relating to the .. .
payment for . . . care and services available under the plan
. . . as may be necessary to . . . assure that payments are
consistent with efficiency, economy, and quality of care and
are sufficient to enlist enough providers so that care and
services are available under the plan at least to the extent that
such care and services are available to the general population
in the geographic area . . . . 39
HHS regulations "implement" Section 30(A), but do not define the
terms "consistent" or "efficiency, economy, and quality of care.""
HHS has chosen expressly not to define the terms within these
two statutory provisions. 4 ' The federal agency has left to the states the
job of interpreting these provisions when developing payment policies
36 See id.; Orthopaedic Hosp. v. Kizer, No. 90-4209, slip op. at 11 (C.D. Cal. June 28, 1991)
(order denying summary judgment and requesting further briefing); New York v. Sullivan, 894
F.2d 20, 22 (2c1 Cir. 1990); New York v. Bowen, 811 F.2d 776, 779 (2d Cir, 1987); Michigan Hosp.
Ass'n v. Department of Social Servs., 555 F. Supp. 675, 677 (E.D. Mich. 1983) (outpatient costs
may not be included in rates tinder Boren Amendment). Hospital outpatient costs are costs for
services furnished to patients who are not admitted for inpatient treatment, by an institution that
is licensed as a hospital, which are preventive, diagnostic, therapeutic, rehabilitative or palliative.
See 42 C.F.R. § 440.20(a) (1992).
" See 42 U.S.C. § 1396a(a) (30) (A).
" Id.
39 Id. This Note does not address cases regarding the provision of Section 30(A) which
requires equal access to care. For discussion of access to care under Section 30(A), see, e.g.,
Arkansas Medical Soc'y v. Arkansas Dep't of Human Servs., 6 F.3d 519, 525-31 (8th Cir. 1993);
Pennsylvania Ass'n of Home Health Agencies v. Snider, 826 F. Supp. 948, 950-52 (E.D. Pa. 1993);
Fulkerson v. Maine Dep't of Human Servs., 802 F. Supp. 529, 533-34 (D. Me. 1992); Clark v, Kizer,
758 F. Supp. 572, 575-79 (E.D. Cal. 1990).
46 See 42 C.F.R. 447.250(b) (stating "Section 447.253(a)(2) implements" Section 30). But
see 42 C.F.R. § 447.253(a), which does not have a clause labeled (2). See also 42 C.F.R. § 447.300
(stating in this subpart, §§ 447.302 through 447.334 and 447.361 implement" Section 30).
4t 48 Fed. Reg. 56,049 (1983). See also Foiden v. Washington Dep't of Social & Health Servs.,
744 E Supp. 1507, 1532 (W.D. Wash. 1990).
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for medicaid providers." As discussed below, federal courts have played
a substantial role in interpreting at least the Boren Amendment."
Among the many other provisions governing provider payment,
HHS imposed an overall limit on individual state payments to medicaid
providers based on medicare reasonable charges." An individual state's
aggregate payments to its medicaid providers may not exceed the
aggregate payment the state would have paid under a medicare rea-
sonable charges calculation." This provision caps a state's total medi-
caid provider payment, made after 1981, at the level of medicare
reasonable charges—the pre-1981 level of payment." HHS regulations
impose this requirement for payments made under the Boren Amend-
ment and Section 30(A). 47
In summary, medicaid payment rates for inpatient facilities are
governed by the Boren Amendment and HHS regulations which
merely repeat the language of the Boren Amendment." Under this
statutory and regulatory scheme states are required to pay providers
of inpatient services at rates which are reasonable and adequate to
meet the costs of efficiently and economically operated facilities." In
contrast, the medicaid rates for all other types of providers are gen-
erally governed by Section 30(A) and companion HHS regulations,
which require states to pay rates which are consistent with efficiency,
economy and quality of care. 5° Finally, HHS regulations impose a cap
on all state medicaid payment rates, prohibiting overall payments to
providers from exceeding medicare reasonable charges. 5 '
42 See 48 Fed. Reg. 56,049.
43 See infra notes 49-72 and accompanying text.
44 42 CYR §§ 447.253(b) (2), 447.272, 447.304. "[A]ggregate payments by an agency to each
group or health care facilities (that is, hospitals, nursing facilities and 1CFs [intermediate care
facilities] for the mentally retarded ("1CFs/MR")), may not exceed the atnount that can reason-
ably be estimated would have been paid for those services under Medicare payment principles."
42 C.F.R. § 447.272(a). An exception is made for payment to hospitals serving a disproportionate
number of low income patients with special needs. 42 C.F.R. § 447.272(c). See also 42 C.F.R.
§ 447.253(h) ( I) (ii) (A) (governing payment to hospitals serving a disproportionately large num-
ber of low income patients with special needs).
45 See 42 C.F.R. §§ 447.272(a), 447.253(b)(2).
46 See 42 C.F.R. §§ 447,272(a), 447.253(b) (2).
47 42 C.F.R. § 447.253(h)(2) (Boren Amendment); 42 C.F.R. §§ 447.304 to 447.362 (Section
30(A)).
48 42 U.S.C. §








42 C.F.R. § 447.253(b)(1)(i).
42 C.F.R. § 447.253(b)(1)(i)•
42 C.F.R. §§ 447,300 to .334, 447.561.
51 42 C.F.R. § 447.272(a).
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IL RECOGNIZING A § 1983 CAUSE OF ACTION FOR MEDICAID
PROVIDERS
A. Enforcing the Boren Amendment
In the 1990 case of Wilder v. Virginia Hospital Association, the
United States Supreme Court held that hospitals could enforce the
provisions of the Boren Amendment, the statute governing payment
rates for inpatient facility services, under a § 1983 cause of action."
The lower standard of a § 1983 cause of action, as compared with an
implied right of action, has prompted increased litigation as a result
of the easier access to federal courts." The Court's recognition of a
52 See Wilder v. Virginia Hosp. Ass'n, 496 U.S. 498, 524 ( 1990). Section 1983 provides:
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or
usage, of any State or Territory or the District of Columbia, subjects, or causes to
be subjected, any citizen of the United States ... to the deprivation of any rights,
privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall he liable to
the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for
redress.
42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1988). The Supreme Court has recognized t he use of § 1983 as a valid method
of enforcing a wide range of statutorily created rights under federal law, See, e.g., Golden State
Transit Corp. v. City of Los Angeles, 493 U.S. 103, 113 (1989) (enforcing unions and management
rights tinder Taft-Hartley Act); Wright v. City of Roanoke Redev. Hosts. Auth., 479 U.S. 418,
419 (1987) (enforcing tenants' rights under federal housing laws); Maine v. Thiboutot, 448 U.S.
1, 4 (1979) (enforcing recipient rights' under Social Security Act).
53 See WALTER GELLHORN Er Al.., ADMINISTRATIVE LAW: CASKS AND COMMENTS 1191-94 (8th
ed. 1987) (comparing restrictive view of implied right of action, and Far more generous approach
tinder § 1983). See also Thiboutol, 448 U.S. at 23 (Powell, j., dissenting) ("No one can predict the
extent to which litigation arising from today's decision will harass state and local officials, nor
can one foresee the number of new filings in our already overburdened courts.").
Section 1983 does not speak in terms of violations of federal law, but instead refers to "rights,
privileges, or immunities," Golden State, 493 U.S. at 106. The cause of action does, however, extend
to enforcement of rights created by federal law. Thibmaot, 448 U.S. at 4. To bring a § 1983 cause
or action to enforce a statute, plaintiffs must fulfill a three-part test. See Wilder, 496 U.S. at 509;
Dennis v. Higgins, 498 U.S. 439, 44849 (1991). First, the plaintiff must be the intended bene-
ficiary of the statute. Golden Slate, 493 U.S. at 112. Second, the statute must impose a binding
obligation that is more than a "congressional preference." Pennhurst State School & Hosp. v.
Halderman, 451 U.S. I, 19 (1981). Third, the statute must not be "too vague and amorphous"
such that it is "beyond the competence of the judiciary to enforce." Golden State, 493 U.S. at 106
(quoting Wright, 479 U.S. at 431-32). Courts may interpret a statute that is not too vague and
amorphous by considering the "standards" of the agency. See Wright, 479 U.S. at 431-32. Section
1983 creates both a procedural right and a substantive right. Wilder, 496 U.S. at 510.
In its recent decision. Suter v. Artist M., the U.S. Supreme Court slid not expressly follow Me
three-part test for a § 1983 action, and instead re-emphasized the Pennhtsrst requirement that the
right must be unambiguously conferred by Congress. 112 S. Ct. 1360, 1366 (1992) (holding
Adoption Assistance and Child Welfare Act provision requiring "reasonable efforts" was not
enforceable under § 1983 cause of action, but instead was only generalized duty of state). While
the opinion of the Court cited Wilder repeatedly, the dissent concluded that the Court's failure
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§ 1983 cause of action for medicaid providers suing under the Boren
Amendment has brought about the predicted flood of provider suits. 54
to use the three-part test in Wilder and Dennis contravened precedent. See id. at 1365-67, 1377
(Blackmun, J., dissenting). Several lower courts have concluded, however, that Suter did not
overrule Wilder, Wright or Golden State, nor did it replace the analytical framework of these cases.
See, e.g., Arkansas Medical Soc'y, No. 93-2352, 1993 U.S. App. LEXIS 23106, at *13-16; Stowell v.
Ives, 972 F.2d 65, 68 (1st Cir. 1992); Evelyn V. v. Kings County Hosp. Ctr., 819 F. Supp. 183, 194
(E.D.N.Y. 1993). Such courts have chosen to synthesize Suter and Wilder by proceeding with the
analytical framework in place, bearing in mind the additional consideration mandated by Suter:
Arkansas Medical Soc'y, No. 93-2352, 1993 U.S. App. LEXIS 23106, at *15. See also Chan v. City
of New York, 803 F. Supp. 710, 721 (S.D.N.Y. 1992) (stating jurisprudence concerning whether
given statute creates right, privilege or immunity under § 1983 is in state of flux), affd, 1 F.3d
96 (2d Cir. 1993).
The alternate method for plaintiffs attempting to enforce federal statutes is through an
implied right of action. SeeTouche Ross v. Redington, 442 U.S. 560, 575-76 (1979); Cort v. Ash,
422 U.S. 66, 78 (1975). The plaintiff is required to meet a four-part test to determine "whether
Congress intended to create the private remedy asserted" for the violation of statutory rights. See
Transamerica Mortgage Advisors, Inc. v. Lewis, 444 U.S. 11, 15-16 (1979). This test reflects a
concern for the separation of powers, such that Congress, rather than the courts, controls the
availability of remedies for violations of statutes. See Wilder, 496 U.S. at 508 n.9. For a recent
discussion of providers' implied rights of action to enforce provisions of the Medicaid Act, see
Illinois Hosp. Ass'n v. Edgar, 765 F. Supp. 1343, 1352 (N.D. 111. 1991), holding that providers have
no implied right of action to enforce the waiver provision of the Medicaid Act (42 U.S.C.
§ 1396n). See also Wood v. Wallace, 825 F. Supp. 177, 182-83 (S.D. Ohio 1993) (incorporating
Suter and Wilder analysis in review of action to enforce waiver provision).
54 See, e.g., Lisa Colasi, Note, Wilder v. Virginia Hospital Association: Making the Medicaid
Reimbursement Rate Challenge a Federal Case, 12 PACE L. Rev, 139, 165 (1992) (predicting increase
in provider suits under Boren Amendment as result of Wilder decision); C. Lee Cusenbary, Jr.,
Note, Under the Boren Amendment, Health Care Providers Have an Enforceable Right, Actionable
Under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, to Challenge a State's Reimbursement Plan Under the Medicaid Act, 22 Sr.
MAitv's LJ. 519, 540 (1990) (same); Michael D. Daneker, Note, Medicaid, State Cost-Containment
Measures, and Section 1983 Provider Actions . Under Wilder v. Virginia Hospital Association, 45
VAND. L. REV. 487, 489 (1992) (same); Ellen Tracy, Note, Health Care Providers' Right under Section
1983 to Enforce the Boren Amendment to the Medicaid Act, 30 WAstinum LJ. 578, 587-88 (1991)
(same).
The following are merely the reported federal Boren Amendment cases decided after Wilder
as of Dec. 1993: Abbeville Gen. Hosp. v. Ramsey, 3 F.3d 797 (5th Cir. 1993); Oregon Ass'n of
Homes for the Aging, Inc. v. Oregon Dept of Human Resources, 5 F.3d 1239 (9th Cir. 1993);
Illinois Health Care Ass'n v. Bradley, 983 F.2d 1460 (7th Cir. 1993); Folden v. Washington Dep't
of Social & Health Servs., 981 F.2d 1054 (9th Cir. 1992); United Cerebral Palsy Ass'n v. Cuomo,
966 F.2d 743 (2d Cir. 1992); Bethphage Lutheran Serv. v. Weicker, 965 F.2d 1239 (2d Cir. 1992);
Lett v. Magnant, 965 F.2d 251 (7th Cir. 1992); Kansas Health Care Ass'n v. Kansas Dep't of Social
& Rehab. Servs., 958 F.2d 1018 (10th Cir. 1992); Illinois Council on Long Term Care v. Bradley,
957 F.2d 305 (7th Cir. 1992); Yorktown Med. Lab. v. Perales, 948 F.2d 84 (2d Cir. 1991); Temple
Univ. v. White, 941 F.2d 201 (3d Cir. 1991); Pinnacle Nursing Home v. Axelrod, 928 F.2d 1306
(2d Cir. 1991); Pennsylvania Ass'n of Home Health Agencies v. Snider, 826 F. Supp. 948 (E.D.
Penn. 1993); Kansas Health Care Ass'n, Inc. v. Kansas Dep't of Social & Rehab. Servs., 822 F.
Supp. 698 (D. Kan. 1993); Evelyn V. v. Kings County Hosp. Cir., 819 F. Supp. 183 (E.D.N.Y. 1993);
Oklahoma Nursing Home Ass'n v. Demps, 816 F. Supp. 688 (W.D. Okla. 1992); Texas Hosp. Ass'n
v. National Heritage Ins. Co., 802 F. Stipp. 1507 (W.1). Tex. 1992); Kansas Health Care Ass'n v.
Kansas Dept of Social & Rehab. Servs., 794 F. Supp. 356 (1). Kan. 1992); Connecticut Hosp. Ass'o
v. O'Neill, 793 F. Stipp. 47 (D. Conn. 1992); Hartland Hosp. v. Stangler, 792 F. Supp. 670 (W.D.
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In Wilder, the Court concluded that the Boren Amendment was
enforceable because it fulfilled the three-part test creating a § 1983
cause of action." First, the Court concluded that the plaintiffs were the
intended beneficiaries of the statute." Second, the Boren Amendment
imposes a binding obligation on states to adopt reasonable and ade-
quate rates. 57 Third, the Boren Amendment requirement that rates be
reasonable and adequate to meet the costs that must be incurred by
efficiently and economically operated facilities is not too vague and
amorphous to be judicially enforceable." As such, the standard these
providers must meet to challenge the Boren Amendment is less strict
than the standard for an implied cause of action."
In rejecting the argument that the Boren Amendment is too vague
and amorphous to be judicially enforceable, the Wilder Court reasoned
that the statute and regulations set out factors that a state must con-
sider in adopting its rates." The Court noted the following factors that
states must consider: (I) the unique situation of disproportionate
share hospitals, (2) the requirement of adequate nursing home care,
and (3) the special situation of hospitals providing inpatient care when
long-term care at a nursing home would be sufficient but is unavail-
Mo. 1992); Massachusetts Fecrn or Nursing Homes v. Commonwealth, 791 F. Stipp. 899 (D. Mass.
1992); Oklahoma Nursing Home Ass'n v. Detnps, 792 F. Supp. 721 (W•D. Okla. 1992); United
Cerebral Palsy Ass'n v. Cuomo, 783 F. Stipp. 43 (N.D.N.Y. 1992); Bethphage Lutheran Seri?, v.
Weicker, 777 F. Stipp. 1093 (1). Conn. 1991); Rye Piychiatric Hosp. Ctr. v. Slides, 777 F. Supp.
1142 (S.D.N.Y. 1991); Illinois Health Care Ass'n v. Bradley, 776 F. Supp. 411 (N.D. III. 1991);
Massachusetts Fed'it of Nursing Homes v. Commonwealth, 772 F. Stipp. 31 (I). Mass. 1991);
Capitol Hill Hosp. v. District of Columbia, 769 F. Supp. 16 (D• D.C. 1991); Rye Psychiatric Hosp.
Cu'. v. Surles, 768 F. Stipp. 82 (S•D.N.Y. 1991); Multicare Med. Ctr. v. Washington Dep'i of Social
& Health Servs., 768 F. Stipp. 1349 (W.D. Wash. 1991); Missouri Health Care Ass . ii v. &angler,
765 F. Stipp. 1413 (WA). Mo. 1991); Illinois Hosp. Ass'n v. Edgar, 765 E Stapp. 1343 (N.D. Ill.
1991); Lapeer County Med. Care Facility v. Michigan, 765 F. Stipp. 1291 (W.D. Midi. 1991);
Illinois Council on Long Term Care v. Bradley, 759 F. Stipp. 1309 (N.D. Ill. 1991); Michigan Hosp.
Ass'n v. Babcock, No. 5:89-GV-00070, 1991 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 2058 (W.D. Mich. Feb. 11, 1991);
Kansas Health Care Ass'n v. Kansas Dep't of Social & Rehab. Servs., 754 F. Stipp. 1502 (D. Kan.
1990); Kansas Health Care Ass'n v. Kansas Dep't of Social & Rehab. Servs., No. 90-4207-S, 1990
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 17854 (D. Kan. Dec. 4, 1990); Francisco v. Dep't of Human Resources, No.
89-6244-HO, 1990 U.S. Dist. LIDOS 19766 (D. Or. July 10, 1990).
55 Wilder, 496 U.S. at 509. Fur further discussion of the appropriateness of recognizing a
§ 1983 cause of action, sec generally Cass R. Sunstein, Section 1983 and the Private Enforcement
of Federal Law, 49 U. Cm. L. REV. 394 (1982).
56 Wilder, 496 U.S. at 510.
57 1d. at 512.
58 Id. at 519.
59 See Galion', supra note 50, at 1192. For a more detailed discussion of the impact of
recognizing a § 1983 cause of action under the Boren Amendment, see generally, Daneker, supra
note 51; Colasi, supra note 51; Tracy, supra note 51; Cusenbary, supra note 51.
60 vtriNK,.., 496 U.S. at 519.
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able." In addition, the Court stated that efficiently and economically
operated facilities that provide care in compliance with federal and
state standards, and assure reasonable access to medicaid participants,
provide an "objective benchmark" against which states can judge the
reasonableness of their rates." The Court stated that, although the
statute gives states substantial discretion in making this judgment, rates
must fall within a range of reasonable rates in order to meet. the Boren
Amendment standard." Finally, the Court stated that the Boren
Amendment is not too vague and amorphous because, although evalu-
ation of state rates may require some knowledge of the hospital indus-
try, such an inquiry is well within the competence of the judiciary."
As a result of the Court's determination that the Boren Amend-
ment is not too vague and amorphous to be judicially enforced, states
face the problem of identifying the unique objective benchmark for
the payment of their inpatient hospital and long-term care medicaid
providers: what is in fact an efficiently and economically operated
inpatient facility." Two of the three factors the Wilder Court suggested
as guidance in determining this objective benchmark address ex-
ceptions to the typical Boren Amendment provider: disproportionate
share hospitals and hospitals substituting for nursing homes. 66 These
"unique" and "special" situations do not determine which of the re-
maining facilities are objectively efficient and economical." The
Court's third factor is the statutory requirements for adequate care in
nursing homes." This factor does not address hospitals and interme-
diate care facilities ("ICFs") for the mentally retarded, and, although
suggesting criteria for evaluating adequacy, does not identify which
nursing homes are efficient or economical."
61 Id. at 519 n.17.
62 Id. at 519.
66 Id. at 519-20.
64 Id. at 520.
66 See Wilder, 496 U.S. at 519; 42 U.S.C. § 1396a(a)(13) (A).
66 See Wilder, 496 U.S. at 519 n.17. 42 U.S.C. § 1396a(a) (13) (A) requires, in relevant part,
that states consider:
(1) the unique situation (financial and otherwise) of a hospital that serves a
disproportionate number of low income patients ... and (3) the special situation
of hospitals providing inpatient care when long-term care at a nursing home would
be sufficient but is unavailable.
Id.
67 See Wilder, 496 U.S. at 519.
68 1d. 42 U.S.C. § 1396a(a)(13) (A) requires, in relevant part, that states consider "(2) the






The Wilder Court stated that there may be a range within which
medicaid rates are reasonable." The Wilder Court noted that rate
methodologies based on only the budgetary reduction needs of the
state, and methodologies that provide no justification for treating
out-of-state hospitals and in-state hospitals differently, fall outside of
the range of reasonableness because they have absolutely no relevance
to the costs of an efficient hospita1. 7 ' Because the Court did not deter-
mine the range for reasonable rates, extensive litigation has ensued
over whether particular rates are within the zone of reasonableness."
The Wilder Court determined that the judiciary is competent to
evaluate the reasonableness of rates." Although the judiciary has de-
bated the appropriate role of judges in technical areas, the consensus
has been that judges are competent, and in fact are obligated, to review
even very technical issues. 74 Review of recent cases on the adequacy of
payment to medicaid providers makes clear the high level of detail and
complexity of the issues involved," In such cases, judges without par-
ticular expertise in the health care system must consider whether
complex rate methodologies for the reimbursement of capital costs,
wage inflators, diagnosis-related groups ("DRGs"), and many other
component costs of providing health care, in fact do meet the costs of
efficiently and economically operated facilities. 76
B. Enforcing Section 30(A)
The Supreme Court has not made a determination that Section
30(A), the federal statute governing payment for outpatient services
7° See id. at 519-20. HCFA evinced this zone of reasonableness standard as well. 48 Fed, Reg.
56,049 (1983).
71 See Wilder, 496 U.S. at 520 & n.18.
72 See, e.g., West Virginia Univ. Hosps. v. Casey, 885 F.2d 11, 26 (3d Cir. 1989) (discussing
range of acceptable rates); Colorado Health Care Ass'n v. Colorado Dept of Social Servs., 842
F.2d 1158, 1167 (10th Cir. 1988) (same); Wisconsin Hosp. Ass'n v. Reivitz, 733 F.2d 1126, 1133
(7th Cir. 1984) (same). HCFA itself stated that a reasonable and adequate rate is one which falls
within a range. See 48 Fed. Reg. 56,049 (1983).
73 See Wilder, 496 U.S. at 520.
71 See Ethyl Corp. v. EPA, 541 F.2d 1, 66-68 (D.C. Cir.) (Bazelon, J., concurring), 68-69
(Leventhal, J., concurring), cert. denied, E.I. Du Pont de Nemours & Co. v. EPA, 426 U.S. 941
(1976).
75
 See, e.g., Temple Univ. v. White, 941 F.2d 201, 205 (3d Cir. 1991); Casey, 885 F.2d at 14;
AMISUB v. Colorado Dept of Social Servs., 879 F.2d 789, 791 (10th Cir. 1989); Muldcare Med.
Ctr. v. Washington, 768 F. Stipp. 1349, 1359 (W.D. Wash. 1991); Folden v. Washington Dept of
Social & Health Servs., 744 F. Supp. 1507, 1510 (W.D. Wash. 1990), affd, 981 F.2d 1054 (9th Cir.
1992).
76 See, e.g., Temple, 941 F.2d at 205; Casey, 885 F.2d at 14; AMISUB, 879 F.2d at 791; Multicare,
768 F. Supp. at 1359; Folden, 744 F. Stipp. at 1510.
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and most non-acute services, is enforceable under § 1983, as it did in
Wilder with respect to the Boren Amendment. 77 Federal district courts
currently disagree over whether Section 30(A) is judicially enforceable
pursuant to § 1983. 78
 The United States Appeals Court for the Eighth
Circuit suggested, in dicta, that it finds the Section 30(A) requirement
that rates be consistent with efficiency, economy and quality of care, is
enforceable.78
In the 1992 case of Fulkerson v. Maine Department of Human Serv-
ices, the United States District Court for the District of Maine deter-
mined that the Section 30(A) requirement that rates be consistent with
efficiency, economy, and quality of care, was too vague and amorphous
to be judicially enforceable. 80 In Fulkerson, a class action was brought
by, and on behalf of, Maine medicaid recipients against the state
medicaid agency, alleging that rules that required recipients to pay
co-payment fees for medical services violated Section 30(A).81 In con-
trast with the Wilder Court's recognition of an objective benchmark in
the efficient and economic facility, 82 the Fulkerson court concluded that
an objective determination could not be made as to whether a particu-
lar state plan satisfies the efficiency, economy and quality of care
requirement in Section 30(A)." The Fulkerson court noted the
difficulty in evaluating quality of care by stating that the courts are not
qualified for the task of accommodating Congress's competing objec-
77 See Wilder, 496 U.S. at 509-10 (right to "rates that are reasonable and adequate to meet
the costs of an efficiently and economically operated facility.. . .").
78 Compare Fulkerson v. Maine Dep't of Human Servs., 802 F. Stipp. 529, 534 (D. Me. 1992)
(efficiency, economy and quality of care under Section 30(A) is not enfbrceable under § 1983)
with Illinois Hosp. Ass'n v. Edgar, 765 F. Supp. 1343, 1349 (N.D. Ill. 1991) (efficiency, economy
and quality of care under Section 30(A) is enforceable under § 1983) and Orthopaedic Hosp, v.
Kizer, No. 90-4209, slip op. at 7 (C.D. Cal. June 28, 1991) (order denying summary judgment
and requesting further briefing),
"Arkansas Med. Soc'y, Inc. v. Reynolds, 6 F.3d 519, 527 (8th Cir. 1993).
"Fulkerson, 802 F. Supp. at 534. The Fulkerson court did, however, find enforceable the
"equal access provision" in Section 30(A), which requires that rates be sufficient to enlist enough
providers so that care and services are available under the plan at least to the extent that care
and services are available to the general population in the geographic area. Id. at 533. The court
found that the equal access provision met the three-part test for a § 1983 cause of action: it was
clearly intended to benefit the plaintiffs, it imposed a binding obligation on states, and was not
too vague and amorphous. See id. at 533-34. In finding this provision . was not too vague and
amorphous, the court cited the availability of statistical data on access, and Clark v. Kizer, 758 F.
Supp. 572, 575-79 (E.D. Cal. 1990), which enforced the provision in 1990. See id. at 534. Unlike
the efficiency, economy and quality of care provision of Section 30(A), the court found the equal
access provision within the competence of the judiciary to enforce. See id. See supra note 39 for
additional cases discussing the equal access provision.
81
 Id. at 531-32.
82 Wilder 496 U.S. at 519.
"Fulkerson, 802 F. Supp. at 534.
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tives of controlling costs and providing quality care as evinced in
Section 30(A)."
In contrast with Fulkerson, the United States District Court for the
Northern District of Illinois has recognized a § 1983 cause of action
under Section 30(A), without discussing whether it is too vague and
amorphous." In the 1991 case of Illinois Hospital Association v. Edgar,
a group of acute care hospitals sued the state medicaid agency for
inadequate reimbursement of outpatient hospital services under both
the Boren Amendment and Section 30(A). 86 The Edgar court con-
cluded that the plaintiffs could bring a § 1983 cause of action against
the state to enforce Section 30(A). 87 The court cited Wilder in its
discussion of enforceable rights, but did not address the issue of
whether Section 30(A) is too vague and amorphous." The Edgar court
considered only whether the plaintiffs were the intended beneficiaries
of Section 30(A), and whether the statute imposed a binding obliga-
tion on states: two parts of the three-part test used in Wilder and
Fulkerson.89
In the 1992 case of Orthopaedic Hospital v. Kizer, the United States
District Court for the Central District of California similarly held that
hospitals have a right under Section 30(A) that is enforceable under
§ 1983." The Orthopaedic Hospital court compared the language .of
Section 30(A) with the language of the Boren Amendment, and con-
cluded that both sections were equally obligatory in their wording and
neither section was too vague and amorphous to be judicially enforce-
able."' In finding no principled distinction between the two sections,
the court noted that both addressed (1) rates for hospital reimburse-
ment, and (2) the criteria of efficiency and quality. 92
The only difference the Orthopaedic Hospital court found was that
the Boren Amendment imposes an additional obligation on the state
1" See id. at 534-35.
85 See Illinois Hosp. Ass'n v. Edgar, 765 F. Supp. 1343, 1349 (N.D. 111, 1991).
86 Id. at 1346 (see Count IV).
87 1d. at 1349,
88 See id. at 1348-49.
89 Id. at 1349; see Wilder v. Virginia Hosp. Ass'n, 496 U.S. 498, 509 (1990); Fulkerson, 802 F.
Supp. at 533.
"Orthopaedic Hosp. v. Kizer, No. 90-4209, slip op. at 7 (C.D. Cal. June 28, 1991) (order
denying summaryjudgment and requesting further briefing). See also Orthopacdic Hosp. v. Kizer,
No. 90-4209, 1992 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 21123, *44-46 (C.D. Cat. Oct. 6, 1992) (finding state rate
setting arbitrary and capricious; remanding matter to state agency).
91 Orthopaedic Hosp., No. 90-4209, slip op. at 6 (order denying summary judgment and
requesting further briefing).
92 Id. at 5.
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to make findings." The court determined that the terms of Section
30(A) are more vague because the provision refers only to such rates
as are "consistent with efficiency, economy, and quality of care," in
contrast with the terms of the Boren Amendment, which are capable
of "precise computation."94 Reasoning that the additional Section
30(A) requirement of equal access is as readily ascertainable, "at least
in theory," as the objective benchmark of an efficiently and economi-
cally operated facility, the Orthopaedic Hospital court concluded that
the imprecision of the statute was not a basis for distinguishing be-
tween the Boren Amendment and Section 30(A) . 95
In the 1993 case of Arkansas Medical Society, Inc. v. Reynolds, the
United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit suggested in
dicta that it agreed with the Orthopaedic Hospital and Edgar courts,
and held that the Section 30(A) requirement for consistency with
efficiency, economy, and quality of care was enforceable. 96 In discussing
whether another requirement of Section 30(A), the equal access re-
quirement, was enforceable, the court stated that it disagreed with the
Fulkerson court's conclusion that the efficiency, economy, and quality
of care provision was not specific enough to allow enforceability under
§ 1983." The Reynolds court looked to the Wilder opinion, and con-
cluded it was controlling on this point." The court reasoned that the
Boren Amendment language was arguably more nebulous than the
Section 30(A) language." The court made this point, however, when
discussing the equal access provision, not the efficiency, economy, and
quality of care provision.'" The Eighth Circuit did expressly disagree,
albeit in dicta, with the Fulkerson court's reasoning, and agreed with
the reasoning of the Orthopaedic Hospital and Edgar courts.' 91
In summary, the Supreme Court has conclusively determined that
the Boren Amendment, requiring medicaid payments to hospitals and
nursing homes to be reasonable and adequate to meet the costs of
efficiently and economically operated facilities, is enforceable under
95 Id. at 5-6.
94 See id at 6,
95 Id. at 6.
96 6 F.3d 519,527 (8th Cir. 1993).
97 /d. Several courts have considered the enforceability of the equal access provision of
Section 30(A), a claim typically raised by beneficiaries of state medicaid programs. Courts have
generally concluded that the equal access provision is enforceable. See supra note 39 for a list of
cases interpreting this issue.
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§ 1983. 102 The Wilder Court held that the language of the Boren
Amendment was not too vague and amorphous to be judicially enforce-
able because of the factors listed in the statute, and the objective
benchmark created by an efficient and economical facility.'" The Su-
preme Court has not considered the enforceability of the Section
30(A) requirement that payments to other providers be consistent with
efficiency, economy, and quality of care. Several lower courts have
applied the reasoning of Wilder to section 30(A) and concluded that
both provisions are equally enforceable.'" At least one federal court,
however, has refused to follow Wilder, and concluded that the language
of Section 30(A) is too vague and amorphous to be judicially en-
forced.'"
III. THE. STANDARD OF REVIEW IN MEDICAID PAYMENT CASES
In its Wilder decision, the Supreme Court left unresolved the issue
of the proper standard of review for state agency attempts to comply
with the Boren Amendment.'" After recognizing a § 1983 cause of
action, and thereby determining that interpretation of the Boren
Amendment is within the competence of the judiciary, the next issue
is how courts should review state rate-making decisions under the
statute. 1 °7 The Court noted in Wilder that a right enforceable under
§ 1983 is not merely a procedural right that rates be accompanied by
findings and assurances of reasonableness and adequacy, but also a
substantive right to reasonable and adequate rates.m 8 Several courts
have used some variation of the arbitrary and capricious standard of
review in Boren Amendment cases.'" In Orthopaedic Hospital, the court
102 Wilder v. Virginia Hosp. Ass'n, 496 U.S. 498, 524 (1990).
105 1d. at 519.
"Orthopaedic Hosp. v. Kizer, No. 90-4209 slip op. at 7 (C.D. Cal. June 28, 1991) (order
denying summary judgment and requesting further briefing); Illinois Hosp. Ass'n v. Edgar, 765
F. Supp. 1343, 1349 (N.D. III. 1991). See also Reynolds, 6 F.3d at 527 (dicta discussion); Orthopae-
dic Hosp. v. Kizer, No. 90-4209, 1992 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 21123 at *44-46 (C.D. Cal. Oct. 6,
199'2) (remanding matter to agency).
imFulkerson v. Main Dep't of Human Servs., 802 E Supp. 529, 534 (D. Me. 1992).
106 Wilder, 496 U.S. at 520 n.18 ("We express no opinion as to which of the [Boren Amend-
ment] cases contains the correct articulation of the appropriate standard of review.").
1 °7 See id.; Orthopaedic Hospital, No. 90-4209, slip op. at 7 (C.D. Cal, June 28, 1991) (order
denying summary judgment and requesting further briefing).
108 Wilder, 496 U.S. at 510.
111° See, e.g., AMISUB v. Colorado Dep't of Social Servs., 879 F.2d 789, 800-01 (10th Cir. 1989)
(finding payment rate for inpatient hospitals arbitrary and capricious because state based decision
on only budgetary factors); West Virginia Univ. Hosps. v. Casey, 885 F,2d 11, 24, 35 (3d Cir, 1989)
(finding payment rate for out-of-state hospitals arbitrary and capricioits because state failed to
consider adequately all relevant Factors); Mary Washington Hosp. v. Fisher, 635 F. Supp. 891, 897
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employed an arbitrary and capricious standard in reviewing state medi-
caid agency compliance with Section 30 (A)."°
In the leading case of Citizens to Preserve Overton Park v. Volpe, the
United States Supreme Court stated that a reviewing court must decide
whether the actions of an agency are arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of
discretion or otherwise not in accordance with law."' The arbitrary and
capricious standard is applied to non-adjudicatory agency actions sub-
ject to the Administrative Procedure Act ("APA"), and is also applied
to non-adjudicatory agency action which is not specifically subject to
the APA." 2
 This standard of review is a narrow one, in which a court
may not substitute its judgment for that of the agency. 113 Although the
judiciary is the final authority on issues of statutory construction, a
reviewing court may overturn an agency's action only if the agency's
interpretation of the law was impermissible."' An agency's interpreta-
tion of the law is impermissible if it would frustrate Congress's goals. 115
Further, the reviewing court must determine whether the agency
decision was based on a consideration of the relevant factors. 115 If an
agency failed to consider relevant factors, its decision must be set
aside.'" Adequate consideration of relevant factors requires that an
agency provide a rational connection between the facts found and the
choice made." 8 When a statute directs an agency to consider certain
(E.D. Va. 1985) (applying arbitrary and capricious standard of review to payment rate); California
Hosp. Ass'n v. Schweiker, 559 F. Supp. 110, 117 (C.D. Cal. 1982), affd, 705 F.2d 466 (9th Cir.
1983) (finding payment rate for inpatient hospitals arbitrary and capricious because state failed
to consider all relevant factors); Mississippi Hosp. Ass'n v. Heckler, 701 F.2d 511, 516 (5th Cir.
1983) (applying relevant factors test to inpatient hospital payment rate); Thomas v. Johnston, 557
F. Supp. 879, 901, 910 (W.D. Tex. 1983) (invalidating payment rate because state failed to consider
all relevant factors).
I to Orthopaedic Hospital, No. 90-4209, slip op. at 8 (C.D. Cal. June 28, 1991) (order denying
summary judgment and requesting further briefing). See also Louisiana v. United States Dep't of
Health & Human Servs., 905 F.2d 877, 881 (5th Cir. 1990) (arbitrary and capricious standard of
review, citing 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A), for pharmaceutical rates issued pursuant to agency regula-
tions), reh'g denied, 1990 U.S. App. LEXIS 15147 (5th Cir. Aug. 14, 1990).
111 401 U.S. 402, 416 (1971).
112 M at 414; 5 U.S.C. § 705(2)(A) (1982).
115 Motor Vehicles Mfrs. Ass'n v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29, 43 (1983); SEC
v. Chenery Corp., 332 U.S. 194, 196, reh'g denied, 332 U.S. 783 (1947).
114 See Chevron v. NRDC, 467 . U.S. 837, 843 & n.9 (holding EPA's interpretation of Clean Air
Act term was reasonable interpretation, therefore valid), reh'g denied, 468 U.S. 1227 (1984).
115 See Continental Air Lines v. Department of Transp., 843 F.2d 1444, 1453 (D.C. Cir. 1988).
116 Overton Park, 401 U.S. at 416.
117 See id.; State Farm, 463 U.S. at 43 (failure to consider alternatives and relevant factors,
without explanation, constituted arbitrary and capricious action).
115 See State Farm, 463 U.S. at 52 (citing Burlington Truck Lines, Inc. v. United States, 371
U.S. 156, 168 (1962)).
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factors in making a particular decision, it may implicitly prohibit the
administrator from taking other factors into account."'"
The degree of judicial deference to agency interpretation is de-
pendent upon the complexity of the issue and the relative expertise of
an agency as compared with the court.'" The weight given to an
agency's interpretation depends upon the thoroughness evident in its
consideration, the validity of its reasoning, its consistency with earlier
and later pronouncements and its persuasiveness.' 21
A. Judicial Review of Boren Amendment Rates
In Wilder, the Court expressly did not decide which of the previous
Boren Amendment cases contained a correct articulation of the appro-
priate standard of review.' 22 The Court did note, however, that when a
state has complied with the procedural requirements of the Boren
Amendment, a court employs a deferential standard of review to evalu-
ate whether the rates comply with the substantive requirements. 12" The
Court cited five cases that employed different variations on the arbi-
trary and capricious standard of review.' 21 After Wilder, courts reviewing
compliance with the Boren Amendment have generally reviewed state
action on the basis of whether it was arbitrary and capricious.'" Several
119 See Am erican Textile Mfrs. Inst. v. Donovan, 452 U.S. 490,512 (1981) (prohibiting agency
from relying on factor specifically forbidden by statute); Addison v. Holly Hill Fruit Prods. Co.,
322 U.S. 607, 618-19 (remanding regulation because it used factor not identified by statute, and
failed to use factor required by statute), reltk denied, 323 U.S. 809 (1944).
120 Ford Motor Credit Corp. v. Milhollin, 444 U.S. 555, 568-69 (1980). See also Ethyl Corp. v.
EPA, 541 F,2d I, 67 (D.C. Cir. 1976) (Bazelon, j., concurring) ("substantive review of mathemati-
cal and scientific evidence by technically illiterate judges is dangerously unreliable").
In Skidmore v. Swift Sc Co., 323 U.S. 134, 140 (1944) (giving significant weight to agency
interpretation out of respect for its knowledge and experience, and need for uniform standards).
122
 Wilder v. Virginia Hosp. Ass'n, 496 U.S. 498, 520 n.18 (1990).
223 Id,
121 1d. (citing AMISUB v. Colorado Dep't of Social Servs., 879 F,2d 789, 795-801 (10th Cir.
1989) (court not limited to merely an arbitrary and capricious standard of review, but must
determine whether plan is procedurally and substantively in compliance with Boren Amend-
ment); West Virginia Univ. Hosps. v. Casey, 885 F.2d 11, 23-24 (3rd Cir. 1989) (court will not
engage in independent assessment, but will only inquire whether determination was arbitrary
and capricious, and whether state complied with access and disproportionate share require-
ments); Nebraska Health Care Ass'n v. Dunning, 778 F.2d 1291, 1294-95 (8th Cir. 1985) (court
requires objective evidence of effects of proposed rates to determine whether actions were
arbitrary and capricious, or to review factual findings, but HHS decision "significantly" aids
court), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 1063 (1987); Wisconsin Hosp. Ass'n v. Reivitz, 733 F.2d 1226, 1234-38
(7th Cir. 1984) (same); Mississippi Hosp. Assn v. 11 eckler, 701 F.2d 511, 516 (5th Cir. 1983) (court
decides whether law violated; review is limited to deciding whether action is arbitrary and
capricious)).
125 See, e.g., Folder v. Washington Dept of Social & Health Servs., 981 F.2d 1054, 1058 (9th
Cir. 1992); Pinnacle Nursing Home v. Axelrod, 928 F,2d 1306, 1313 (2d Cir. 1991); Illinois Health
158	 BOSTON COLLEGE LAW REVIEW 	 [Vol. 35:141
of these courts have recited the proposition that state actions are
presumed valid.' 26 Some courts, however, have employed something
less than a deferential standard of review in assessing substantive com-
pliance with the Boren Amendment."'
For example, in the 1991 case of Multicare Medical Center v. Wash-
ington, the United States District Court for the Western District of
Washington issued a fifty-three- page decision finding that the state's
reimbursement system for inpatient hospital services both proce-
durally and substantively violated the Boren Amendment. 128 In a deci-
sion that shocked both commentators and state medicaid officials, a
federal judge delved into highly technical areas of reimbursement. 129
The Multicare court decided many complex issues, such as that occu-
pancy was a measure of efficiency and economy, but licensed bed
occupancy was not a valid indicator;"° factors such as urban/rural
setting and wage differentials were not required for peer groupings;"'
capping component costs at the median was not reasonable; 12 freezing
capital costs at a prior year's peer group medial was reasonable;" 3 and
use of a particular update factor as a retrospective and prospective
inflation factor was not valid."'
Several courts, including the Multicare court, have agreed on some
general requirements for medicaid rate methodologies.' 35 For exam-
ple, rates must fall within a zone of reasonableness;' 36 a nexus must
Care Ass'n v. Bradley, 776 F. Supp. 411, 417 (N.D. III. 1991); Multicare Medical Cu: v. Washington,
768 F. Supp. 1349, 1389 (W.D. Wash. 1991).
126 See, e.g., Alden, 981 F.2d at 1058; Bradley, 776 F. Supp. at 417; Mullicare, 768 F. Supp. at
1392.
127 See Multi care, 768 F. Supp. at 1392, 1396 (state not entitled to deference afforded federal
agency; state failing to meet procedural requirements carries burden of proof of substantive
compliance); Connecticut Hosp. Ass'n v. O'Neill, 793 F. Supp. 47, 52 (D. Conn. 1992) (court may
properly examine state's findings to determine if they comply with law).
128 Mullicare, 768 F. Supp. at 1402.
129 See generally Multicare, 768 F. Supp. 1349. For a discussion of state agencies' reactions and
their (and their lawyers') concerns regarding the Mu Ilicare decision and other cases, see generally
"Before and After the Lawsuit: Medicaid's Boren Amendment" (Jeff Harris, ed., 1992) (transcript
of 12/9-10/91 conference proceedings of the Medicaid Management Institute, American Public
Welfare Association).
13" See Multicare 768 F. Supp. at 1381.
131 id. at 1394.
132 1d.
153 Id.
154 Id. at 1394-95.
135 See infra notes 121 -25 and accompanying text.
13' See, e.g., Folder v. Washington Dep't of Social & Health Servs., 981 F.2d 1054, 1058 (9th
Cir. 1992); West Virginia Univ. Hosps. v. Casey, 855 F.2d 11, 26 (3d Cir. 1989); Colorado Health
Care Ass'n v. Colorado Dept of Social Servs., 842 F.2d 1158, 1167 (10th Cir. 1988); Wisconsin
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exist between rates and economical provider's reasonable costs;'" only
the overall rate must be reasonable, not the individual components
that comprise the rate;"8
 the required findings need not be written;' 39
and budgetary constraints alone can never be a sufficient basis for
rates.'" While these areas of agreement may provide some guidance,
a highly complex body of common law is developing in an area gov-
erned in large measure by statutes and regulations."'
The Multicare court identified the conceptual problem of deter-
mining what rates meet the costs of efficiently and economically oper-
ated facilities when it criticized the potential for circular reasoning by
states.'" The court stated that:
While the identification and determination of economically
and efficiently operated hospitals may be implicit in the rate
setting methodology, the State cannot base its findings as to
the reasonableness and adequacy of its payment rates on the
rate setting methodology alone . . . . To say that the State's
finding that its rates are reasonable and adequate is implicit
in the methodology is to say that the rates are reasonable and
adequate because they pay the costs that the State has deter-
mined it should pay. 143
States, however, are left with the continuing problem of finding
some other reasonably principled basis for proving their rates are
reasonable and adequate to meet the costs that must be incurred
by efficiently and economically operated providers; states are also
left with the problem of determining what constitutes a nexus, or
rational connection, between their findings and their conclusions.'"
In the 1992 case of Connecticut Hospital Association v. O'Neill, thirty
acute care hospitals challenged Connecticut's rate methodology for
Hosp. Ass'n v. Reivitz, 733 F.2d 1226, 1233 (7th Cir. 1984); Multicare, 768 F. Stipp. at 1396; Folden
v. Washington Dep't of Social & Health Servs., 744 E Supp. 1507, 1529 (W.D. Wash. 1990).
137 See, e.g., Pinnacle Nursing Home v, Axelrod, 928 F.2d 1306, 1313 (2d Cir. 1991); Casey,
885 F.2d at 28; AMISUB v. Colorado Dep't of Social Servs., 879 F.2(1 789, 800 (10th Cir. 1989);
Colorado Health Care Ass'n, 842 F.2d at 1167; Illinois Health Care Ass'n v. Bradley, 776 F. Stipp.
411, 419 (N.D. III. 1991); Multicare, 768 F. Supp. at 1397.
138
 See, e.g., Colorado Health Care Ass'n, 842 F.2d at. 1169; Multicare, 768 F. Stipp. at 1397.
139
 See, e.g., Colorado Health Care Ass'n, 842 F.2d at 1168; Multicare, 768 F. Supp. at 1392;
Mary Washington Hosp. v. Fisher, 635 F. Supp. 891, 897 (ED. Va. 1985).
119 See, e.g., AMISUB, 879 F.2d at 801; Multicare, 768 F. Supp. at 1393; Michigan Hosp. Ass'n
v. Babcock, 736 F. Stipp. 759, 764 (W.D. Mich, 1990).
111 See supra notes 121-25.
192 See Multicare, 768 F. Supp. at 1393.
143 Id,
144 See id.
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inpatient costs."' The state had been paying providers the federally
imposed "upper limit"146—what the state would have paid under medi-
care."' The state claimed that, because it was paying at the maximum
aggregate amount permitted by federal law, the complaint should be
dismissed.'" The United States District Court for the District of Con-
necticut disagreed, indicating that it would not accept the argument
that the upper limit supersedes the requirements of the Boren Amend-
ment as dispositive of whether the state is in compliance with the
Medicaid Act.I 49
The Supreme Court left open the issue in Wilder of the appropri-
ate standard of review for agency rate decisions under the Boren
Amendment.' 5° Without this guidance, many courts have chosen to
delve into the highly technical areas of rating methodologies, and have
refused to defer to agency expertise. 151 The result has been a complex,
confusing, and often conflicting body of law regarding what constitutes
procedural and substantive compliance with the medicaid payment
statute.' 52
B. Judicial Review of Section 30(A) Rates
In the 1992 case of Orthopaedic Hospital v. Kizer, the United States
District Court for the Central District of California held that the state
medicaid agency's compliance with Section 30(A) would be reviewed
under an arbitrary and capricious standard.'" In making this determi-
nation, the court relied on both administrative law precedent and
Boren Amendment cases.' 54 The court stated that to determine
whether the rates were valid, the court must determine (1) whether
the agency had considered all relevant factors and (2) whether the
facts found and relevant factors considered were rationally connected
to the rates of payment set.' 55
145 Connecticut Hosp. Ass'n v. O'Neill, 793 F. Supp. 47, 48 (D. Conn. 1992).
14f) See supra notes 45-48 and accompanying text (discussing upper li mit).
147 See O'Neill, 793 F. Supp. at 48, 49.
148 Id. at 48.
149 See id. at 50.
Wilder, 496 U.S. at 520 n.18.
151 See, e.g., Multicare, 768 F. Supp. at 1402; O'Neill, 793 F. Supp. al 4 8.
152 See, e.g.. Multicare, 768 F. Supp. at 1402; O'Neill, 793 F. Supp. al 4 8.
158
 Orthopaedic Hosp. v. Kizer, No. 90-4209, at 8 (C.D. Cal. June 28, 1991) (order denying
summary judgment and requesting further briefing).
154 Id. (citing Citizens to Preserve Overton Park v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402, 416 (1971) and
AMISUB v. Colorado Dep't of Social Servs., 879 F.2d 789, 800 (10th Cir. 1989)).
165 Orthopaedie Hosp. v. Kizer, No. 90-4209, U.S. Dist. LEX1S 21123 *10 (C.D. Cal. Oct. 5,
1992) (order granting plaintiffs' motion for summary judgment).
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Before determining whether the agency had considered all rele-
vant factors, the court considered what factors were relevant.'''' The
court concluded that relevant factors were found in Section 30(A),
namely efficiency, economy and quality of care.' 57
 The court noted that
these were not necessarily all of the relevant factors, but did not reach
the question of what other factors were relevant. 158
The Orthopaedic Hospital court stated that under circumstances in
which clear evidence of congressional intent exists, such as in Section
30(A), the court will examine whether an agency considered certain
relevant factors that the agency was not specifically required to con-
sider.'" The court acknowledged that such review may appear unfair
to the agency, but that such scrutiny might be desirable because it may
encourage agencies to consider all relevant factors.''" The court noted
that this scrutiny was consistent with Supreme Court cases. 1" 1 The
absence of a statutory or regulatory requirement that agencies con-
sider efficiency, economy and quality of care did not preclude the
court, it reasoned, from basing its decision on whether the agency
considered those factors.' 62
The Orthopaedic Hospital court stated that the agency could not
rely on state legislative pronouncements suggesting that efficiency,
economy and quality of care were deemed "considered" if the agency
itself had discretion to set the precise payment rate."'. 3 The burden on
the state was to provide evidence both that (1) in setting the rates, the
agency merely implemented a precisely-crafted statutory enactment
that did not permit any agency discretion and (2) the legislature had
expressly considered efficiency, economy and quality of care upon
enactment of the statute. 1 G4 The Orthopaedic Hospital court, however,
found evidence of neither in the state agency's rates under Section
30 (A) . 11i ' ,
15(I
 See id. at *10-15.
167 Id. at *10-22.
158
 /d. at *11 n.3.
169 1d. at *16 (emphasis in original).
16° Orthopaedic Hosp., No. 90-4209, U.S. Dist. LEXIS 21123 at *16 ii.8.
161 /d. at 16-20 (citing American Paper Inst. v. American Eke. Power Serv. Corp., 461 U.S.
402,413 (1983) and Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass'n v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29,43
(1983)).
1112 See id. at *21.
163 14. at *23-25, 28-30.
164 /4. at *30, 34.
165 Orthopaedic Hosp., No. 90-4209, U.S. Dist. LEXIS 21123 at *30, 34. The court did, however,
find that rate increases For three specific outpatient services were adequately considered, and
therefore not arbitrary and capricious. Id. *44. In its reasoning, the court noted that the agency's
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Finally, the Orthopaedic Hospital court found no rational connec-
tion between the relevant factors and the rates because it concluded
that the agency did not consider the relevant factors.' 66 The court
therefore concluded that the agency acted arbitrarily and capriciously
in setting general outpatient rates. 167 The court ordered that the matter
be remanded to the agency for further consideration consistent with
the opinion. 168 At this writing, the plaintiffs have submitted a request
for clarification of the judgment, seeking invalidation of the rates. 169
Following the majority of Boren Amendment cases, the court in
Orthopaedic Hospital refused to defer to the agency's expertise, and
instead determined that the agency had acted arbitrarily and capri-
ciously in setting rates under Section 30 (A). 1 " The court determined
that efficiency, economy and quality of care are factors the agency must
consider and suggested that the court may require the agency to
consider additional factors not mentioned in the statute."' The Ortho-
paedic Hospital court appears to be the first court to evince a standard
of review for agency compliance with Section 30(A)'s efficiency, econ-
omy and quality of care requirement.'" The court failed, however, to
invalidate the rates, concluding that the matter should be remanded
to the agency for compliance with the court's decision. 17"
IV. SOLUTIONS FOR MEDICAID PROVIDER PAYMENT AND REFORM OF
THE HEALTH CARE SYSTEM: CHALLENGES FOR THE 21ST CENTURY
The current trend in medicaid provider payment litigation does
not bode well for incremental reform of the health care system. The
Supreme Court's Wilder decision definitively established a substantial
role for the judiciary in the increasingly complex financial relations
statement of reasons specifically addressed the issues of access, quality and adequacy of care and
cost effectiveness. See id. at *39-42.
166 Id. at *43.
1 °7 Id.
" Id. at *45. '
1 c° See Orthopaedic Hosp. v. Kizer, No. 90-4209, at 1-2 (C.D. Cal. Dec. 4, 1992) (plaintiffs'
notice of motion and motion to alter or amend revised judgment).
170 Orthopaedic Hasp., No. 90-4209, U.S. Dist. LEXIS 21123 at *43.
171 Id. at *16.
172 Orthopaedic Hasp. v. Kizer, No. 90-4209, at 8 (C.D. Cal. June 28, 1991) (order denying
summary judgment and requesting further briefing); Orthopaedic Hospital v. Kizer, No. 90-4209,
U.S. Disc LEXIS 21123 *10 (C.D. Cal. Oct. 5, 1992) (order granting plaintiffs' motion for
summary judgment). But seeArkansas Med. Soc'y, Inc. v. Reynolds, 6 F.5d 519, 531 (8th Cir. 1993)
(holding agency Failed to consider relevant factors in equal access provision and thereby violated
Section 30(A)).
173 Orthopaedic Hosp. v. Kizer, No. 90-4209, U.S. Dist. LEXIS 21123 *45 (C.D. Cal. Oct. 5,
1992).
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between states and their medicaid providers. 174 There are several con-
siderations that make the Court's decision that medicaid providers are
entitled to a § 1983 cause of action to challenge state compliance with
the Boren Amendment unwise and legally suspect: 76
Industry experts were surprised that the Court concluded there
was "little doubt" that providers are the intended beneficiaries of a
federal law designed to govern a public assistance program benefitting
the poor and disabled: 76 Also surprising was the Court's determination
that federal HCFA approval of an overall rate structure and an appeals
process for provider challenge of the individual application of rates
does not protect states from invalidation of rates—rates over which
states were intended by Congress to have substantial con tro1. 177 Finally,
the Court's decision that federal courts could and should determine
the subtleties of one of the country's most complex and changing fields
precludes rational progress in provider payment systems: 78 In Wilder,
the Court refused to defer to state and federal expertise in health care
financing, even in light of the heretofore clear congressional intent to
delegate substantial technical decisionmaking power to the administra-
tive arm of government.' 79
A. The Unenforceability of Section 30(A): Distinctions Between the Boren
Amendment and Section 30(A)
The Wilder precedent presents a dilemma for lower courts consid-
ering challenges to Section 30(A) rates: 8° Such courts have two op-
174 See Wilder v. Virginia Hosp. Ass'n, 496 U.S. 498, 520 (1990) (stating whether Mies arc
reasonable is inquiry well within competence of judiciary).
175 See generally, e.g., Colasi, supra note 51 (criticizing Wilder dccisio n); Cusenbary, supra note
51 (same); Daneker, supra note 51 (same); Tracy, supra note 51 (same).
175 See Wilder, 496 U.S. at 510; 'Before and After the Lawsuit: Medicaid's Boren Amendment"
7 (Jeff Harris, ed., 1992) (transcript of 12/9-10/91 conference proceedings of Medicaid Man-
agement Institute, American Public Welfare Association).
177 See Wilder, 496 U.S. at 522-23 (holding appeal procedures which do not allow providers
to challenge overall rate methodology arc insufficient to protect state from § 1983 cause of
action). But see Multicare Medical Ctr. v. Washington, 768 F. Supp. 1349, 1401 (W.D. Wash. 1991)
(ordering state to devise appeals process which "[allows] hospitals to raise potentially relevant
special factors without opening itself up to frivolous appeals" (citations omitted)); West Virginia
Univ. Hosps. v. Casey, 885 F.2d 11, 31 (3rd Cir. 1989) (federal regulations implementing Boren
Amendment reserve to judgment of states the decision whether to allow challenges to validity
methodology at administrative level).
178 See Wilder, 496 U.S. at 520 (reasonableness of rates is within competence of judiciary).
175 See id. at 519-20,
1" See id. at 520. See, e.g., Fulkerson v. Maine Dept of Human Servs., 802 F. Stipp. 529, 533
(D. Maine 1992); Orthopaedic Hasp, v. Kizer, Np. 904209, at 4 (C.D. Cal. June 28, 1991) (order
denying summary judgment and requesting further briefing).
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tions. By analogizing to the Wilder Court's decision on the Boren
Amendment, a court may reason that interpretation of the even more
ambiguous and precatory language of Section 30(A) is within the
competence of the judiciary.' 8 ' Alternatively, courts, reasoning without
much precedent, may allow only one group of providers (hospitals,
nursing homes and 1CF/MRs) to challenge only a portion of their
payment rates (inpatient service rates). 182 Courts faced with this di-
lemma have, not surprisingly, issued conflicting decisions. 183
Both the Boren Amendment and Section 30(A) suffer from the
same vagueness of terms.'" The Supreme Court stated that the Boren
Amendment offers factors as guidance in determining the objective
benchmark of efficiency and economy, and the adequacy of rates.'"
These "factors," however, have little to do with the majority of provid-
ers, as they address only providers with unique and special situations.' 88
In contrast, Section 30(A) does not offer guiding factors, even for
unique and special providers. 187
The Fulkerson court appears to have recognized the distinctions
between the Boren Amendment and Section 30(A).' 88 Although the
Fulkerson court did not specifically discuss why Section 30(A) and its
implementing regulations do not allow for an objective determination
when the Boren Amendment does, the statutes offer some insight. 1 e"
The Boren Amendment refers to efficiently and economically operated
facilities, in contrast with Section 30(A), which refers to the concepts of
efficiency, economy and quality of care.'"
The Boren Amendment also requires that payment to providers
meet the costs of facilities. 131 In contrast, Section 30(A) requires that
payment to providers be consistent with the concepts of efficiency,
economy and quality of care.'" The less concrete requirement for
°' See, e.g., Orthopaedic Hosp., No. 90-4209, at 8 (Oct. 5, 1992) (order granting plaintiffs'
motion for summary judgment); see also Arkansas Medical Soc'y, Inc. v. Reynolds, 6 F.3d 519, 527
(8th Cir. 1993).
182 See, e.g., Fulkerson, 802 F. Supp. at 533.
163 See, e.g, id. (finding Section 30(A) too vague and amorphous to be judicially enforceable);
Orthopaedic Hosp., No. 90-4209, at 7 (C.D. Cal. June 28, 1991) (order denying stimmaryjudgment
and requesting further briefing) (finding Section 30(A) enforceable).
184 See 42 U.S.C. §§ 1396a(a)(13) (A), 1396a(a)(30) (A).
185 Wilder, 496 U.S. at 519.
186 See id at 519 n.17.
187 See 42 U.S.C. § 1396a(a) (30)(A).
188 See FuUterson, 802 F. Supp. at 533-35.
189 See id. at 534; 42 U.S.C. §§ 1396a(a) (30)(A), 1396a(a) (13) (A).
42 U.S.C. §§ 1396a(a) (13)(A), 1396a(a) (30) (A).
191 42 U.S.C. § 1396a(a)(13) (A),
192 42 U.S.C. § 1396a(a)(30) (A).
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consistency, rather than reimbursing costs, may be another reason for
the Fulkerson court's unwillingness to find an objective benchmark in
Section 30(A) and its implementing regulations.'"
Furthermore, Section 30(A) adds an additional requirement of
quality, which is not a factor in the Boren Amendment„ 194
 Considerable
debate has occurred regarding what constitutes quality in health care,
and how quality can be measured.'" The Fulkerson court noted the
difficulty in evaluating quality of care by stating that the courts are not
qualified for the task of accommodating Congress's competing objec-
tives in Section 30(A) of controlling costs and providing quality care,
a conflict which is arguably not present in the language of the Boren
Amendment.'"
Finally, Section 30(A) does not impose a requirement similar to
the Boren Amendment which requires states to make findings and
assurances regarding the adequacy of rates.' 97
 Under Section 30(A), a
state must merely ensure that its plan includes payment methods and
procedures to assure payments are consistent with efficiency, economy
and quality of care.'" The Boren Amendment offers a court the two
concrete guides of findings and assurances which address the adequacy
of rates, whereas Section 30(A) offers no such information directly
addressing whether rates are consistent with its requirements, and
instead requires a court to review, generally, the methods and proce-
dures relating to payment.'`1°
As a practical matter, payment methodologies for reimbursement
of the types of providers under the Boren Amendment, such as hospi-
tals and nursing homes, are developed on a group, or peer group,
basis, accounting for the differences between types of providers.'" In
195 See Fulkerson, 802 E Stipp. at 534.
194 42 U.S.C. §§ 1396a(a) (30) (A), 1396a(a) (13) (A); but see Orthopaedic Hosp. v. Kizer, No,
90-4209, at 5 (C.D. Cal. June 28, 1991) (order denying summary judgment and requesting further
briefing) (Boren Amendment includes quality as criterion),
196 SeeAvedis Do nabedian, Quality, Cost and Clinical Decisions, 468 THE ANNALS 196, 199-204
(July 1983) (discussing measurement and promotion of quality care); Havighurst, Practice Guide-
lines as Legal Standards Governing Physician Liability, LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 87, 87-94 (Spring
1991) (same).
196
 See Fulkerson„ 802 F. Sup p. at 534-35; but see Orthopaedic Hosp. v. Kizer, No. 90-4209, at
5 (C.D. Cal. June 28, 1991) (order denying summary judgment and requesting further briefing)
(Boren Amendment includes quality as criterion).
197 42 U.S.C. § 1396a(a) (13) (A). See 42 U.S.C. § 1396a(a) (30) (A).
19x42 U.S.G. § 1396a(a) (30) (A).
199 See 42 U.S.C. §§ 1396a(a) (13)(A), 1396a(a) (30)(A).
290 See, e.g., Buchanan, supra note 11, at 60; AMISUB v. Colorado Dep't of Social Servs., 879
F.2d 789, 798 (10th Cir. 1989); Illinois Health Care Ass'n v. Bradley, 776 E Supp. 411, 419 (N.D.
Ill. 1991).
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contrast, many providers under Section 30(A) are paid at rates that do
not necessarily reflect the unique characteristics or costs of providers."'
These statutory and practical differences between the Boren Amend-
ment and Section 30(A) may account for the Fulkerson court's deter-
mination that Section 30(A) requires specialized knowledge of the
workings of the health care system, and that such a determination is
beyond the competence of the judiciary. 202
Both the Orthopaedic Hospital and Edgar courts found Section
30(A) enforceable under a § 1983 cause of action."' In Orthopaedic
Hospital, the court followed Wilder's three-part test, concluding that
the increased vagueness of Section 30(A) was an insufficient basis for
distinguishing between the obligations imposed on states by Section
30(A) and the Boren Amendment."' An explanation of the Edgar
court's failure to address whether Section 30(A) is too vague and
amorphous for judicial enforcement is not readily apparent."' The
Eighth Circuit failed to support its assertion in Reynolds that the Boren
Amendment is more nebulous than the Section 30(A) provision re-
quiring consistency with efficiency, economy and quality of care, and
instead focused on the equal access provision in Section 30 (A)." 6 The
Reynolds court's statement that the Boren Amendment is more nebu-
lous than Section 30(A), and its rejection of the Fulkerson court's
reasoning appears to be dicta, at best, and fails to advance the issue. 207
201 See, e.g., Louisiana v. United States Dept of Health & Human Servs., 905 F.2d 877, 881
(5th Cir. 1990) (state used Average Wholesale Price from American Druggists' Blue Book for
reimbursement of pharmaceutical drugs, which exceeded pharmacists' actual costs and is argu-
ably not the closest estimate for general and current drug prices); Clark v. Kizer, 758 F. Supp.
572, 577 (E.D. Cal. 1990) (state utilized maximum reimbursement rates for dental services, which
increased at less than half of Dental Consumer Price Index rate of increase, and reimbursed
approximately 40% of dental providers' usual rates).
2°2 See Fulkerson v. Maine Dept of Human Servs., 802 F. Supp. 529, 534-35 (D. Me. 1992).
"Orthopaedic Hosp. v. Kizer, No. 90.4209, at 7 (C.D. Cal. June 28, 1991) (order denying
summary judgment and requesting further briefing); Illinois Hosp. Ass'n v. Edgar, 765 F. Supp.
1343, 1349 (N.D. Ill. 1991).
204 See Orthopaedic Hosp., No. 90-4209, at 6 (C.D. Cal. June 28, 1991) (order denying summary
judgment and requesting further briefing),
205 See Edgar, 765 E Supp. at 1349. In an even more confusing analysis, a federal district court
in Oklahoma also applied only a two-part test in evaluating whether participating nursing homes
could enforce federal medicaid regulations and statutes under § 1983, but went on to refer to,
and not impose, the missing vague and amorphous test in later discussion. See Oklahoma Nursing
Home Ass'n v. Dernps, 792 F, Supp. 721, 725, 728 (W.D. Okla. 1992) (citing Wilder, 496 U.S. at
509). Whether this case recognizes a § 1983 cause of action for enforcement of Section 30(A) is
not immediately apparent. See id. at 726-27.
296 See Arkansas Medical Soc'y, Inc. v. Reynolds, 6 F.3d 519, 527 (8th Cir. 1993).
2°7 M.
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Nor do the facts of Edgar, Orthopaedic Hospital and Fulkerson
warrant different holdings.'" All three cases involved a class of plain-
tiffs previously identified as the intended beneficiaries of the Medicaid
Act.'" In Edgar and Orthopaedic Hospital, the plaintiffs were acute care
hospitals, entitled to seek enforcement of the Boren Amendment: 21 ° In
Fulkerson, the plaintiffs were medicaid recipients, also entitled to seek
enforcement of provisions of the Medicaid Act."" If the basis for the
different holdings in these cases were the class of plaintiffs, such
a distinction must be made under the first part of the Wilder test:
whether the plaintiffs were the intended beneficiaries of the statute. 212
The Edgar and Orthopaedic Hospital courts' unwillingness to make
a distinction between a hospital's right to sue over inpatient versus
outpatient rates is understandable. Such a distinction appears su-
perficially meaningless and inconsistent.213
 The court's superficial and
incompletely reasoned decision in Edgar enabled it to avoid this di-
lemma.'" The more thoughtfully reasoned opinion in Orthopaedic Hos-
pital remains unpublished, but arguably stands as the most compre-
hensive analysis to date of the relevant provisions of Section 30(A) . 215
Although some differences exist between the respective require-
ments of the Boren Amendment and Section 30 (A), 216
 recognition of
a § 1983 cause of action under Section 30(A) for acute care hospitals
208
 See Fulkerson, 802 F. Supp. at 533; Edgar, 765 E Supp. at 1349; Orthopaedic Hosp., No.
90-4209, at 1-2 (C.D. Cal. June 28, 1991) (order denying summary . . judgment and requesting
further briefing).
209 See Fulkerson, 802 E Supp. at 533; Edgar, 765 F. Supp. at 1399; Orthopaedic Hosp., No.
90-4209, at 3 (C.D. Cal. June 28, 1991) (order denying summary judgment and requesting further
briefing).
21 ° See Edgar, 765 F. Supp. at 1344; Orthopaedic Hosp., No. 904209, slip op. at 3-9 (C.D. Cal.
June 28, 1991) (order denying summary judgment and requesting further briefing).
211 See Futherson, 802 E Supp. at 531.
212 See Wilder v. Virginia Hosp. Ass'n, 496 U.S. 498, 509 (1990). While the Fulkerson court
stilted that medicaid recipients were the intended beneficiaries of language under Section 30(A)
addressing equal access, the court did not determine whether they were the intended beneficiar-
ies of efficiency, economy, and quality of care. See 802 F. Supp. at 533-34. One commentator
suggests that medicaid recipients are less appropriate plaintiffs in medicaid rate cases. Henry Paul
Monaghan, Federal Statutory Review under § 1983 and the AIM, 91 Cows'. L. REv. 253, 259 (Mar.
1991). This commentator states that plaintiffs must assert a property-like right to assert that state
rates transgressed federal law, and successfully obtain review. Id.
213
 See Orthopaedic Hospital, No. 904209, at 5 (C.D. Cal. June 28, 1991) (order denying
summary judgment and requesting further briefing).
211
	 Edgar, 756 F. Supp. at 1348-49,
2 i 5
 See Orthopaedic Hosp., No. 90-4209, at 2-7 (C.D. Cat. June 28, 1991) (order denying
summary judgment and requesting further briefing).
216 See supra notes 158-91 and accompanying text.
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but not for beneficiaries is inconsistent.!" Recognizing a § 1983 cause
of action for hospitals under the Boren Amendment, but not under
Section 30(A), also would result in a confusing inconsistency. 218 Analy-
sis of the language of Section 30(A), however, indicates that this pro-
vision is even more nebulous than the language of the Boren Amend-
ment, is too vague and amorphous to be judicially enforceable, and
should be considered beyond the competence of the judiciary. 21 One
commentator doubts whether courts, even if it is within their compe-
tence, have the institutional capacity to determine what rates are rea-
sonable and adequate.22° Faced with the United States Supreme Court's
decision that judicial interpretation of the Boren Amendment is ap-
propriate, the increase in lower courts' meddling in Section 30(A), and
the large body of cases in which federal judges have micro-managed
state medicaid agencies, further judicial interpretation of these specific
provisions would only add to the confusion. Statutory and regulatory
reform is the only promising solution. 22 '
B. The Proper Standard of Judicial Review of Medicaid'Rates
The Supreme Court's decision not to address what constitutes the
appropriate standard of review for the, Boren Amendment leaves a
substantial issue unresolved. 222 While a cursory review of the cases
noted by the Court suggests an almost universal application of the
arbitrary and capricious standard of review, closer scrutiny reveals
substantial inconsistency in the level of deference by courts to agency
expertise and decisionmaking.223 The result of the Supreme Court's
217 See Fulkerson v. Maine Dep't of Human Servs., 802 F. Supp. 529, 533 (D. Me. 1992); Edgar,
765 F. Supp. at 1349.
218 See Orthopaedic Hasp., No. 90-4209, at 5 (C.D. Cal. June 28, 1991) (order denying summary
judgment and requesting further briefing).
219 Fulkersora, 802 F. Supp. at 534-35. But see Arkansas Medical Soc'y, Inc. v. Reynolds, 6 F.3d
519, 527 (8th Cir. 1993) (rejecting Futherson reasoning and arguing Boren Amendment more
nebulous than equal access provision in Section 30(A)).
220 Monaghan, supra note 188, at 259 n.160. For further discussion of review of § 1983 claims,
as compared with the review under § 702 of the APA, see generally, id.
221 One commentator has suggested a statutory amendment to require the Secretary of HHS
to look behind" the findings and assurances of states under the Boren Amendment. See Colasi,
supra note 51, at 173. Such a measure, however, would fail to address the increasing litigation
and interpretation problems of the other provisions of the Medicaid Act. See id.
222 See Wilder v. Virginia Hosp. Ass'n, 496 U.S. 498, 520 n.18 (1990).
21' See supra notes 92-151, and accompanying text; see, e.g.. Folden v. Washington Dep't of
Social & Health Servs., 891 F.2d 1054, 1058 (9th Cir. 1992) (affirming district court decision
which employed arbitrary and capricious standard); Pinnacle Nursing Home v. Axelrod, 928 F.2d
1306, 1313 (2d Cir. 1991); Illinois Health Care Ass'n v. Bradley, 776 F. Supp. 411, 417 (N.D. Ill.
1991); Multicare Med. Ctr. v. Washington, 768 F. Supp. 1349, 1389 (W.D. Wash. 1991).
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failure to determine the issues on which courts should defer to agen-
cies and the issues on which states must expect to be challenged, and
the large and varied body of case law on rate methodologies, have
created a complex and confusing setting within which states must try
to formulate valid payment policies. 224
Both the Multicare and Connecticut Hospital Association cases rep-
resent inappropriately detailed judicial review. 225 While a court may be
able to determine if some rates are clearly unreasonable, the Multicare
court exceeded its proper role by examining and deciding highly
complex and detailed methodological issues. 225 Congress's clear intent
to reserve for the states substantial authority in rate-making decisions
should be given full effect. 227 Courts would better serve the public and
the health care industry by limiting review to whether overall rates are
reasonable and adequate. 228 The judiciary should leave the determina-
tion of complex rate components to the agencies with expertise, in
whom Congress has vested the authority to make such decisions. 229 The
provider appeal procedures that states must establish assure providers
a forum for resolving disputes because they allow appeal of issues other
than the validity of the overall rate. 2"
The Connecticut Hospital Association decision reflects another form
of inappropriate judicial review."' In refusing to dismiss a case in which
the state was paying the maximum amount allowed by federal law, the
court showed either that it did not take into consideration the federal
requirements imposed on states, or that it believed the judiciary has
the authority to remove such requirements. 232 The statutory language
indicates Congress's intent to leave a cap on medicaid rates, and courts
should uphold such express policy.
The providers in Orthopaedic Hospital succeeded in convincing the
court that, whatever Congress meant in Section 30(A) by consistency
22 ' 1 See generally "Before and After the Lawsuit: Medicaid's Boren Amendment" (Jeff Harris,
ed., 1992) (transcript of 12/9-10/91 conference proceedings of the Medicaid Management
institute, American Public Welfare Association).
225 See Connecticut Hosp. Ass'n v. O'Neill, 793 F. Stipp. 47, 50 (D. Conn. 1992); Mu/Of:are,
768 K Stipp. at 1402.
226 See Mullirare, 768 F. Stipp. at 1402.
227 See 48 Fed, Reg, 56,046-49 (1983).
228 See Colorado Health Care Ass'n v, Colorado Dept of Social Servs., 842 F.2d 1158, 1169
(10th Cir. 1988).
2.41 See 48 Fed. Reg. 50,049.
2" See 42 C.F.R. § 447.253(c).
231 See Connecticut Hosp. A.ss'n v. O'Neill, 793 F. Stipp. 47, 50 (D. Conn, 1992).
252 See id.
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with efficiency, economy and quality of care, the state outpatient hos-
pital rates did not comply.'" By remanding the matter to the state
agency, the Orthopaedic Hospital court was able to avoid determining
what constitutes consistency with efficiency, economy and quality of
care, and thereby avoided a detailed decision like that in Multicarem
The Orthopaedic Hospital court's decision to remand the rates to the
agency for review, instead of invalidating the payment system, tem-
pered the success of the providers and created confusion regarding
whether the rates would remain in effect."" The decision, however, was
correct because it left to the agency experts the authority to determine
which rates would be valid and consistent with the court's opinion. 236
Both the Boren Amendment and Section 30(A) are vague and
amorphous, and arguably inappropriate for judicial review. 2s' The ju-
diciary's decision to interpret and enforce these provisions prompts
the question of the proper standard of review.'" Instead of deciding
the detailed complexities of state medicaid methodologies, courts
should limit their review to whether the state's decision was within the
scope of the authority granted by Congress, and whether the exercise
of such authority in the particular case frustrates Congress's intent.'"
C. The Need for Substantial Reform
If reform of the health care system is successful, Congress will
supplant both the Boren Amendment and Section 30(A), and their
accompanying regulations, with a provider payment system that avoids
the current statutory pitfalls and judicial inconsistencies. 240 While the
best structure for administering a national health care system, or a
2" See Orthopaedic Hosp., No. 90-4209, at 35 (C.D. Cal. Oct. 6, 1992) (order granting plain-
tiffs' motion for summary judgment).
231
	 id.; Multicare Med. Ctr. v. Washington, 768 E. Supp. 1349, 1402 (W.D. Wash. 1991).
2'1'5 See Orthopaedic Hosp., No. 90-4209, at 1-2 (C.D. Cal. Dec. 4, 1992) (plaintiffs' notice of
motion and motion to alter or amend revised judgment).
2"See Orthopaedic Hosp., No. 90-4209, at 36 (C.D. Cal. Oct. 5, 1992) (order granting plain-
tiffs' motion for summary judgment).
237
	 42 U.S.C. §§ 1396a(a)(13)(A), 1396a (a)(30) (A).
2" See Wilder v. Virginia Hosp. Ass'n, 496 U.S. 498, 520 n.18 (1990) (Boren Amendment
enforceable under § 1983 cause of action); Orthopaedic Hosp., No. 90-4209, at 7 (C.D. Cal. June
28, 1991) (order denying summary judgment and requesting further briefing) (Section 30(A)
enforceable under § 1983 cause of action).
259 See. Chevron v. NRDC, 467 U.S. 837, 843 & n.9 (1984) (court may overturn agency action
only it' agency's interpretation of the law was impermissible); Continental Air Lines v. Dept of
'transp., 843 F.2d 1444, 1453 (D.C. Cir. 1988) (agency's interpretation of law is impermissible if
it would frustrate Congress' goals).
24° See 42 U.S.C. §§ 1396a (a) (13) (A), 1396a(a) (30) (A).
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reformed system of health care for the poor, disabled and old, is not
obvious, the continuation of state responsibility for local administra-
tion is appropriate. Regional differences—in providers, costs, con-
sumer needs, technology—are best addressed regionally."' Such state
administration would appropriately be subject to federal oversight.
Following are four solutions to the provider payment problems of the
current medicaid system that should be implemented as part of the
reformed health care system.
1. A Less Ambiguous Statutory Delegation of Power
While statutes will always be insufficient to the task of addressing
every possible fact situation, a statute improving upon the Boren
Amendment and Section 30(A) is certainly attainable. Reliance upon
legislative history is not effective; courts willingly noted that Congress
had drafted these provisions with the intent of granting substantial
authority to states to determine what rates were adequate and reason-
able.242
 Federal agency inaction has also proven insufficient to assure
states fleXibility or creative license, as HHS's refusal to more specifically
define the terms of the Boren Amendment has not prevented courts
from encroaching on the authority of the states." 3
A statute that expressly delegates to the states the authority to
determine what rates are reasonable and adequate would provide a
291 See 48 Fed. Reg. 56,049 (1983).
242
 See, e.g., Wilder; 496 U.S. at 505; Connecticut Hosp. Ass'n v. O'Neill, 793 F. Supp. 47, 49
(D. Conn. 1992); MuWeave Med. Ctr. v. Washington, 768 F. Supp. 1349, 1389 (W.D. Wash. 1991);
Illinois Hosp. Ass'n v. Edgar, 765 F. Supp. 1343, 1345 (N.D. III. 1991).
24 The Federal Register included the following statement:
A suggestion was made that either the regulations or the State plan should define
the term "elticieutly and economically operated facility." Since the Medicaid pro-
gram is administered by the State, we believe the States are in a better position to
define or determine what is "efficient and economical" for its Medicaid program.
More importantly, we believe any Federal attempt to impose specific definitions
would unnecessarily intrude upon the legislatively mandated flexibility provided to
States under the statute.
We have also decided not to mandate that the Suite plan specifically provide a
definition of an "efficiently and economically operated facility." The reason for this
is that the Suite's methods and standards implicitly act as the State's definition of
an efficiently and economically operated facility, and no explicit definition is nec-
essary. Moreover, States are best equipped to determine what is an efficient and
economically operated facility for its Medicaid program, and a prescriptive Federal
definition would be contrary to State flexibility. The term "efficiently and economi-
cally operated facility" is one that has not been precisely defined by the Congress,
the Department, or the health care industry.
48 Fed, Reg. 56,049 (1983).
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clear guideline for courts, and would be subject to judicial review on
an arbitrary and capricious standard. 244 Alternatively, a statute could
invest in a federal agency the authority to determine whether states'
rate methodologies were in compliance with federal guidelines, as
opposed to requiring mere "findings and assurances:" review which
would then be subject to an arbitrary and capricious standard. By
including a clear expression of support for state or regional creativity
in payment practices, Congress would ensure that courts uphold less-
than-perfect, yet workable payment reform.
2. Requiring Negotiated Rulemaking
A statutory requirement that states include affected providers in
the development of payment methodology serves two purposes. 245 First,
providers have a voice before they are subject to a new system—beyond
that of merely being able to submit written comments on proposed
regulation—forcing states to address the expressed needs of the
provider community and negotiate final agreements with those most
affected. Second, by negotiating agreements with providers, states,
providers and recipients avoid future litigation over the basic structure
of the payment system. 246
In addition, states should be required to include recipient repre-
sentatives in rulemaking, furthering the same purposes as a require-
ment for provider involvement. Special problems exist, however, as
recipients—particularly individuals in need of public assistance—are
unable to obtain representation to the same extent as providers, who
can hire lawyers and consultants, and form trade associations to further
their interests. While the inclusion of interested parties in rate-making
would complicate the process, the benefits would be great for all
parties involved.
3. Appeals Process
Appeal procedures must remain a central feature of any health
care payment system. if instituted in conjunction with negotiated rule-
making, an appeals process for the fundamental structure of the system
244 For the Supreme Court's discussion of the benefits of granting weight to agency decisions
through legislative delegations, see Field v. Clark, 143 U.S. 649, 693-94 (1892).
245 For a further discussion of negotiated rulemaking, see generally, Note, Rethinking Regu-
lation: Negotiation as an Alternative to Traditional Rulemaking, 94 MARV. L. REV. 1871 (1981).
246 For discussion of the success of negotiated rulemaking, see generally, Procedures for
Negotiated Proposed Regulations (Recommendation 85-51), 50 Fed. Reg. 52,895 (1985).
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would not be necessary for those affected provider or recipient popu-
lations who have been adequately represented. The constitutional
mandate of due process requires that both providers and recipients
have access to appeal procedures, and judicial review of such appeals,
regarding the actual application of payment methodologies.
Any statute must provide sufficient protection for the interests of
providers and recipients of the health care program, balanced against
the interests of the states in offering an affordable, comprehensive plan
to those in need. Providers and recipients must be assured of recourse
to judicial review, and state and federal agencies must be assured
protection of their authority and finality in litigation. In any statute, a
foreclosure of additional remedies and appeals would provide a meas-
ure of finality lacking in current Boren Amendment cases. 247
4. Judicial Review and Remand for Review
The intent of Congress in 1981 was to encourage a reduction in
government expenditures for health care, encourage state creativity
and not impose the medicare standard of payment on states."" Under
the current system, some courts invalidate a new state payment system
and thereby subject the state and its providers to a prior payment
system, which may be even less appropriate for the current condi-
tions.249 In contrast, administrative law precedent supports judicial re-
view as exercised by the Orthopaedic Hospital, in which the court reviews
agency action on an arbitrary and capricious standard, and, upon
finding it arbitrary, remands the issue to the agency for review. 2'0
Such a judicial-review-and-remand-for-review system would pro-
mote the separation of powers in two ways. First, it would impose a
check on agency action, curing arbitrary action or abuse of discretion,
by subjecting such action to judicial review and remand. Second, it
would protect agency administrative powers by reserving for the agen-
cies the appropriate administrative role of issuing legislative regula-
247 See Wilder v. Virginia Hosp. Ass'n, 496 U.S. 498, 522-23 (1990) (appeal procedures are
insufficient to protect state from § 1983 cause of action).
248 See 48 Fed. Reg, 56,046-49 (1983).
249 See, e.g., Temple Univ. v. White, 941 F.2d 201, 220 (3d Cir. 1991); Pinnacle Nursing Home
v. Axelrod, 928 F.2d 1306, 1318 (2d Cir. 1991); Illinois Health Care Ass'n v. Bradley, 776 F. Stipp.
411, 423 (N.D. Ill. 1991); Multicare Medical Ctr. v. Washington, 768 F. Supp. 1349, 1402 (W.D.
Wash, 1991); Babcock, 736 F. Supp. at 764.
250 See Orthopaedic Hosp. v. Kizer, No. 90.4209, at 35 (C.D. Cal. Oct. 6, 1992) (order granting
plaintiffs' motion for summary judgment); see, e.g., Citizens to Preserve Overton Park v. Volpe,
401 U.S. 402, 420-21 (1971).
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Lions: exercising their expertise regarding complex and technical is-
sues for which they are better qualified than the courts. 251 Although a
winning plaintiff may not obtain immediate relief in the form of
invalidated rates, the confusion created by invalidation of a new rate
and imposition of a past rate would be avoided. The revised rates an
agency ultimately issues likely would be more carefully crafted than
one issued by a judge, and could be imposed retroactively. A review-
and-remand-for-review system would also offer finality in agency deci-
sions and litigation, within appropriate boundaries. While agencies
could continue to fight with courts and plaintiffs over the need for
repeated remand, finality would occur when the benefits of making
the suggested changes outweigh the cost of relitigation.
V. CONCLUSION
The current medicaid provider payment system suffers from very
general statutory and regulatory language, and excessive judicial inter-
pretation.'" The result is a complex and confusing body of law govern-
ing provider rates, a body of law that should not be incrementally
revised, but instead should be substantially reformed. A reformed
health care system should avoid the vague delegation of authority over
the determination of rates by expressly delegating authority to federal
and state agencies, with reasonable limits on appeals and judicial
review. The new system should also require negotiated rulemaking and
reasonable appeal procedures to ensure that those beneficiaries and
providers who are affected by the rates have a meaningful opportunity
to ensure that payment to providers is fair and appropriate. Finally, a
reformed health care system should ensure that judicial review is lim-
ited to review of rates, and remand to agencies, where a more careful
and appropriate decision can be made by agency experts and repre-
sentatives of recipients and providers.
ROSEMARY H. RATCLIFF
251 See Ethyl Corp. v. EPA, 541 F.2d 1,66-65 (D.C. Cir. 1976) (Bazelon, J., concurring).
252 See supra notes 49-151, and accompanying text.
